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Abstract
More than 1000 distributed ledger technology (DLT) systems raising $600 billion in investment in 2016 feature the
unprecedented and disruptive potential of blockchain technology. A systematic and data-driven analysis, comparison and
rigorous evaluation of the different design choices of distributed ledgers and their implications is a challenge. The rapidly
evolving nature of the blockchain landscape hinders reaching a common understanding of the techno-socio-economic
design space of distributed ledgers and the cryptoeconomies they support. To fill this gap, this paper makes the following
contributions: (i) A conceptual architecture of DLT systems with which (ii) a taxonomy is designed and (iii) a rigorous
classification of DLT systems is made using real-world data and wisdom of the crowd. (iv) A DLT design guideline is the
end result of applying machine learning methodologies on the classification data. Compared to related work and as defined
in earlier taxonomy theory, the proposed taxonomy is highly comprehensive, robust, explanatory and extensible. The
findings of this paper can provide new insights and better understanding of the key design choices evolving the modeling
complexity of DLT systems, while identifying opportunities for new research contributions and business innovation.
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1 Introduction
Over 1000 systems have emerged in recent years from dis-
tributed ledger technology (DLT), raising $600 billion in
investment in 2016 [75]. They power a large spectrum of
novel distributed applications making use of data
immutability, integrity, fair access, transparency, non-repu-
diation of transactions [87] and cryptocurrencies. These
applications include improving supply-chains
[30, 42, 44, 45], IoT [80], creating self-sovereign identi-
ties1 [5, 48], establishing peer-to-peer energy mar-
kets [2, 35], securing digital voting [43, 60], e-health
[36, 39, 65] and enabling international financial transactions
[71, 87]. The most well-known DLT system is Bitcoin, fea-
turing a novel consensus mechanism2 and a cryptoeconomic
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design3 (CED), which enables untrusted parties to reach
consensus [9]. Bitcoin is the first public DLT system that
prevents double-spending4 and Sybil attacks5 [79].
A distributed ledger (DL) is a distributed data structure,
whose entries are written by the participants of a DLT
system after reaching consensus on the validity of the
entries. A consensus mechanism is usually an integral part
of a distributed ledger system and guarantees system reli-
ability: all written entries are validated without a trusted
third party. Distributed ledgers are designed to support
secure cryptoeconomies, which are capable of operating
cross-border, without depending on a particular political
structure or legal system. These cryptoeconomies rely on
digital currencies referred to as tokens and cryptographic
techniques to regulate how value is exchanged between the
participating actors [6, 16]. The options and choices of a
cryptoeconomy are referred to as cryptoeconomic design
(CED) and this plays a key role in the stability of a DLT
system in terms of convergence, liveness, and fairness [9].
Nevertheless, making system design choices (e.g, on the
type of consensus mechanism) in this rapidly evolving
technological landscape to meet the requirements (e.g.,
security or performance demands) of a broad spectrum of
distributed applications is complex and challenging. The lack
of a common and insightful conceptual framework for DLT
has been cited as a significant barrier in this regard [54, 62].
Moreover, the system configuration space of distributed
ledgers and the cryptoeconomies they support is large, which
has implications on the applicability as well as cost-effec-
tiveness of DLT systems in real-world applications [87]. To
date, these configurations have not been rigorously formal-
ized to guide researchers and practitioners on how to design
DLT systems [22, 23, 62, 82]. Therefore, identifying key
design choices and system configurations that can differen-
tiate distributed ledgers and guide innovation in new DLT
systems can have an impact on reducing the design com-
plexity and cost. It has been argued that this lack of a clear
positioning of DLT systems leads to a fragmentation in the
DLT community and a duplication of effort [76]. The sig-
nificance of this challenge is reflected in the recent tax-
onomies of distributed ledgers [55, 76, 82, 86–88].
This paper derives a useful6 taxonomy of DLT systems
from a novel conceptual architecture. This taxonomy is
then utilized to classify 50 viable and actively maintained
DLT systems. In contrast to earlier work, a novel evalua-
tion methodology is employed that solicits feedback from
the blockchain community and constructively uses it to
validate and further improve the proposed taxonomy and
classification. Moreover, the classification data are utilized
to quantitatively reason about key design choices in the
observed DLT systems, which then, in turn, determine a
design guideline for DLT systems. To make this design
guideline objective, this paper relies on systematic methods
that combine in a novel way (i) literature review, (ii) novel
data collection and (iii) ML-based data analysis. In par-
ticular, the data-driven approach results in a guideline that
structures the modeling complexity of DLT systems and
thus accelerates and simplifies the design phase by
grouping together system design configurations derived
from the attribute values of the taxonomy.
The contributions of this paper are outlined as follows:
1. A conceptual architecture that models DLT systems
with four components. The architecture (Fig. 1) defines
minimal and insightful design elements to illustrate the
inner mechanics of distributed ledgers and the interre-
lationships of their components.
2. A taxonomy (Fig. 2) of distributed ledgers that
formalizes a set of 19 descriptive and qualitative
attributes, including a set of possible values for each
attribute.
3. A classification of 50 DLT systems, including Bitcoin
and Ethereum, backed by an extensive literature
review.
4. A taxonomy evaluation criterion referred to as ‘ex-
pressiveness’ derived from earlier theory on
taxonomies.
5. Crowdsourced feedback from the blockchain commu-
nity to further assess and improve the taxonomy and
classification.
6. A design guideline for DLT systems (Fig. 12), which is
constructed using machine learning techniques to
reason based on empirical data of viable, actively
maintained and academically referenced DLT systems.
7. A methodology (Fig. 3) that utilizes a broad spectrum
of inter-disciplinary methods to derive system design
guidelines by reasoning based on machine learning
techniques, wisdom of the crowd and taxonomy theory.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, terminology
and recent taxonomies for DLT systems are discussed. A
conceptual architecture for DLT systems is introduced in
Sect. 3, while a taxonomy is outlined in Sect. 4. Thereafter,
Sect. 5 illustrates the methodology of the conducted
experiments and Sect. 6 presents the evaluation. Section 7
derives based on the findings of the evaluation a design
3 In particular, paying a block reward (Sect. 4.4) and transaction fees
(Sect. 4.2) to its consensus participants.
4 Faulty transactions of the same token to two different receivers.
5 Setup of fake identities to insert faulty information into the
distributed ledger.
6 Usefulness is defined in Nickerson et al. [52] and formerly
introduced in Sect. 5.2.2.
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guideline for DLT systems. Finally, in Sect. 8 a conclusion
is drawn and an outlook on future work is given.
2 Background and Literature Review
Different types of data structures are utilized in distributed
ledgers to store information. In particular, the literature
distinguishes between distributed ledgers (DL) and block-
chains [66, 87], the latter representing one type of data
structure utilized in the former. Another type of data
structure is the directed acyclic graph [46, 88].
The entries of a distributed ledger contain transactions.
Any type of transaction can be stored, ranging from cryp-
tographically signed financial transactions to hashes of
digital assets, and Turing-complete executable programs
[87], i.e. smart contracts. DLT systems often provide ac-
cess rights to these transactions, which determine who can
initiate transactions, write them to the distributed ledger,
and read them again from the ledger [87]. In addition, DLT
systems utilize so-called tokens [86], which are defined as
a unit of value issued within a DLT system and which can
be used as a medium of exchange or unit of account (see
Sect. 4.4). These tokens span a multi-dimensional incentive
system via which they can promote self-organization [41]
and thus lead to benefits in society [38], such as con-
tributing solutions for the UN Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) [21]. Hence tokens are identified as another
key component of DLT systems in addition to the dis-
tributed ledger [51]. These components can be modeled
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Fig. 1 An overview of the conceptual architecture containing the four key concepts of DLT systems and their relationship: action, consensus,
distributed ledger and token
Fig. 2 Overview of the taxonomy, depicting the two dimensions of
DLT and CED, its four components and 19 attributes
Fig. 3 A novel methodology that combines machine learning
techniques, wisdom of the crowd and taxonomy theory to reason
about a DLT system design guideline
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maintain a native distributed ledger. In such cases, a token
is defined while another system is used to provide the
infrastructure for a distributed ledger. For instance, the
Aragon system does not maintain a natively developed
distributed ledger [20].
The ability to define the type of transactions, access
rights and tokens is used to regulate the behavior of users,
i.e. by limiting and granting access rights to system ser-
vices or by incentivizing specific actions with tokens.
These socio-economic choices not only influence aspects
of the system stability, such as the correctness, liveness and
fairness of the consensus mechanism [9], but also deter-
mine how complex cryptoeconomies emerge [6, 16]. In
other words, cryptoeconomic design (CED) plays a key
role in enabling DLT systems to reach stability and
underpin how the economies form.
A DLT system has to reach consensus before a trans-
action can be permanently written to its ledger [86]. This
consensus mechanism is a functional element of any DLT
system [66], as it enables a decentralized network to take
decisions about the validity of entries in the distributed
ledger [67]. In particular, in the context of DLT systems,
consensus prevents token units from being spent twice [49]
and Sybill attacks [79], which is where fake identities are
used to inject false information into the distributed ledger.
2.1 Comparison of taxonomies for DLT systems
Recent ontologies and taxonomies have been proposed to
structure the design space of DLT systems. A comparative
summary of earlier work is shown in Table 1. Column 3 of
that table depicts if the paper utilizes a conceptual archi-
tecture to construct the taxonomy. Nickerson et al. [52]
suggest to conceptualize the domain of interest for which a
taxonomy is developed. In such a conceptual architecture,
the attributes of a taxonomy should be positioned such that
these are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
[52]. Nevertheless, only Papers 4 and 8 in Table 1 provide
a conceptual architecture (Column 3 in Table 1) that
determines the choice of some of the attributes. For
instance, Paper 4 distinguishes between on-chain and off-
chain components: attributes of the DLT system that exist
on the distributed ledger (e.g. permission management) vs.
attributes that exist outside (e.g. control, data).
A useful taxonomy should be concise and robust [52],
hence using a limited number of attributes that differentiate
the objects of interest. The number of attributes listed in the
papers varies considerably, from 4 to 30 (Column 4 in
Table 1). One explanation is that the papers focus on dif-
ferent aspects of DLT systems and thus study different
(sub)sets of attributes. For instance, Paper 5 focuses on
Internet of Things applications of DLT systems and only
use four attributes (Column 4 in Table 1), whereas Paper 1
designs a taxonomy to model all types of DLT systems and
hence uses 30 attributes (Column 4 in Table 1). Never-
theless, none of the papers justifies the number of selected
attributes. In particular, their impact on conciseness and
robustness of the taxonomy is not evaluated [52]. Also,
several of the attributes potentially overlap with each other
conceptually due to the aforementioned lack of a concep-
tual architecture.
Consensus is identified as a core feature of DLT sys-
tems [67] and as such, it is incorporated in all papers listed
in Table 1. For this reason, it is omitted from this table.
Nevertheless, just four papers consider schemes to incen-
tivize participation in the consensus mechanism (Column 5
in Table 1).
Moreover, only Papers 3 and 5 distinguish between the
different types of data structures in distributed ledgers
(Column 6 in Table 1). For instance, Paper 3 differentiates
between blockchains and directed acyclic graphs. Never-
theless, some of the most recent contributions solely
include blockchain-based DLT systems [14, 76, 82, 87].
Eight papers include cryptoeconomic design in their
taxonomy (Column 7 in Table 1). In particular, seven
papers consider access rights to transactions (Column 8 in
Table 1). Only Papers 1 and 7 derive a taxonomy that
include tokens and their properties (Column 9 in Table 1).
Three papers illustrate a classification of DLT systems
based on their proposed taxonomy (Column 10 in Table 1).
For instance, Paper 5 illustrates the classification of 28
DLT systems. The authors rely on three attributes: data
structure, scalable consensus ledger, and transaction
model [88]. However, neither of the papers introduces a
formal methodology to select the classified DLT systems,
which lowers their objectivity. Also, without a formal
selection methodology, it is not guaranteed that the tax-
onomy enables a comprehensive classification of all known
DLT systems [52].
The usefulness of a taxonomy depends on qualitative
criteria studied in taxonomy theory [52]. An approach to
assess the usefulness of a taxonomy is to utilize crowd-
sourced community feedback and thus the wisdom of the
crowd. This is particularly relevant in the case of DLT
systems and the blockchain community. As the community
shapes the blockchain landscape, soliciting their feedback
can provide both, invaluable new insight into the design of
DLT systems and increase the usefulness of a taxonomy.
Nevertheless, such an endeavor has not been pursued until
nowadays, as shown in Column 11 of Table 1.
Finally, a quantitative evaluation and analysis of tax-
onomy and classification elements by means of statistical
or machine learning methods have not been performed so
far (Column 12 in Table 1). This is a missed opportunity, as
such an approach can provide more objective insights into
the usefulness of taxonomies and identify key design
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choices in DLT systems that structure the modeling com-
plexity of these systems at design phase, as demonstrated in
this paper (Sect. 6.2).
2.2 Summary of limitations
In summary, a few observations can be made about current
DLT system taxonomies. First, they predominantly focus
on the DL and consensus mechanisms, while largely
missing the role of cryptoeconomics and token design,
despite their significant influence on system stability [9].
Second, the interrelationships between the different com-
ponents as well as the choice of attributes are usually not
based on an overarching conceptual architecture. Third,
only three of the papers classify DLT systems. Neverthe-
less, these papers neither utilize a rigorous scientific
methodology nor quantitatively analyze their classification.
As a result, classification is usually not formally validated
and the identification of design choices is limited to qual-
itative criteria. Last but not least, none of the proposed
taxonomies are systematically refined based on feedback
from blockchain practitioners. Such a complementary
external validation process promises to produce more
unbiased taxonomies.
This paper addresses all of the aforementioned limita-
tions identified in the literature and contributes a useful
taxonomy as defined in earlier taxonomy theory [52], built
on a solid conceptual architecture, assessed via classifica-
tions and validated by both, feedback from the blockchain
community and machine learning methods. Moreover, the
quantitative analysis of the classification is utilized to
identify key design choices in observed DLT systems.
3 Conceptual architecture
Based on the study of 50 DLT systems (see Table 2 in
Supplementary Material for an overview of these systems),
a conceptual architecture is introduced in this section. The
architecture is composed of a set of four key components
and shows, how they relate to each other as well as how
they are positioned in the distributed ledger design space.
The architecture is depicted in Fig. 1. The four components
are illustrated in the rest of this section.
Action component: A human or machine performs an
action in the real world (Arrow A in Fig. 1), for example
planting a tree or carrying out a monetary transaction.
Here, at the border between the real world and digital
world, the action is represented digitally, and is referred to
as claim.
Consensus component: Claims are broadcast to all nodes
in the network that can participate in the consensus
mechanism (Arrow B). These nodes (referred to as miners
Table 1 Comparative overview of earlier work outlining the landscape of distributed ledgers
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.














1 Tasca et al.
[76]
– 30 Yes – Yes Yes Yes – – –
2 Comuzzi
et al. [14]
– 8 Yes – Yes Yes – – – –
3 Xu et al. [87] – 13 – Yes Yes Yes – – – –
4 Xu et al. [86] Yes 7 – – Yes Yes – – – –
5 Yeow et al.
[88]
– 4 – Yes – – – Yes – –
6 Okada et al.
[56]
– 4 Yes – Yes – – – – –
7 Wieninger
et al. [82]
– 11 Yes – Yes Yes Yes – – –
8 Dinh et al.
[23]
Yes 9 – – Yes Yes – Yes (partial) – –
9 De Kruijff
et al. [18]
– 6 (many) – – – – – – – –
10 Sarkintudu
et al. [69]
– 5 – – – – – – – –
11 Notheisen
et al. [55]
– 6 – – Yes Yes – Yes – –
This paper Yes 19 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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in Bitcoin or minters in Peercoin) collect these claims to
write them to the distributed ledger.
Distributed ledger component: Participants in the con-
sensus mechanism combine these claims into entries (re-
ferred to as blocks in Bitcoin) and write them to the
distributed ledger (Arrow C). This representation of a claim
on the distributed ledger is called a transaction. Transac-
tions and their containing objects (e.g. smart contracts) that
exist on the distributed ledger are referred to as on-chain, in
contrast to off-chain objects, which exist on the Consensus
or Action component.
Token component: The way token units are created
depends on whether an incentive system is part of the DLT
system. If it is, there are two options: token units are given
as rewards to nodes for either participating in the consensus
mechanism (Arrow D) or carrying out an action (Arrow E).
While the inherent properties of such tokens (e.g. whether
supply is capped or not) are determined by the design of the
DLT system, the value of the token units is backed by a
source of value, which are cryptoeconomic assets that
reside on-chain (Arrow F, for example other tokens or
executable code) or off-chain (Arrow G, for example
goods, services or commodities).
Example Ethereum: In the case of Ethereum, one type of
action involves deploying a piece of code (Arrow A in
Fig. 1), such as a smart contract. These actions are col-
lected by miners (Arrow B) and written as a block to the
Ethereum distributed ledger (Arrow C). A miner who
successfully writes a block obtains Ether, which refers to
newly created units of a token that serves as an incentive to
mine (Arrow D). The Ether token has inherent properties,
e.g. it has uncapped supply. It also has value because it
enables its owner to access the on-chain computational
power of the Ethereum network (Arrow F).
4 Taxonomy
Based on the conceptual architecture of Sect. 3, a taxon-
omy is designed, using the method proposed by Nickerson
et al. [52]. The goal of the taxonomy is to enable a com-
prehensive classification of DLT systems that enable the
quantitative derivation of key design choices in these sys-
tems. For this, the taxonomy illustrates both, the distributed
ledger technology (DLT) and the cryptoeconomic design
(CED) of academically relevant DLT systems. For this, the
taxonomy positions the four components from Sect. 3
across two dimensions (Fig. 2). The first dimension con-
cerns aspects of the system design related to distributed
ledger technology (DLT)—Distributed Ledger component,
Consensus component—, while the second dimension
concerns aspects pertaining to cryptoeconomic design
(CED)—Action component and Token component. In the
following sections, the attributes of each component are
illustrated in greater detail.
4.1 Distributed ledger
Definition 1 A distributed ledger is defined as a dis-
tributed data structure, containing entries that serve as
digital records of actions.
In the Bitcoin system, an entry in the data structure is
called a block. In the IOTA system, it is called a bundle
[68]. An entry contains a set of transactions (Fig. 1, DL
component). In Bitcoin, these transactions represent the
exchange of cryptocurrency value. The attributes of the
distributed ledger are data structure, origin, address
traceability and Turing completeness.
Data structure denotes in which format data is stored on
the distributed ledger. It can be one of the following:
blockchain, directed acyclic graph (DAG) or other. The
well-known data structure is a blockchain; an
immutable and append-only linked list that has a total order
of elements. Several systems use blockchains, such as
Bitcoin [87], Ethereum [19] and Litecoin [34]. In contrast
to these systems, IOTA uses a directed acyclic graph [88].
This data structure is no longer a linked list, but a directed
graph with no cycles, leading to a partial order of elements.
When compared to Blockchains, DAGs trade off security
(e.g. risk of double spending attack) against a higher
transaction throughput by facilitating fast entry confirma-
tion times [28]. Ripple neither uses a blockchain nor a
directed acyclic graph but instead operates on other con-
sensus-based accounting mechanism [33].
Origin refers to who maintains the distributed ledger.
The attribute value can either be native, if the distributed
ledger is maintained by and for the system itself or exter-
nal, if the system uses a distributed ledger from another
DLT system or hybrid if the systems maintain their own
distributed ledger in combination with a distributed ledger
of another DLT system. The level of maintenance varies
between different DLT systems. Bitcoin develops and
maintains its distributed ledger natively, as does NXT [86].
In contrast, Aragon [20], Augur [33, 59] and Counter-
party [88] does not maintain a native distributed ledger,
opting to use the Ethereum or Bitcoin infrastructure
instead. Systems can use a hybrid approach. Factom
combines a natively developed blockchain and its own
consensus mechanism with the Bitcoin blockchain [87].
Address traceability denotes the extent to which dif-
ferent transactions that originate from or arrive at the same
chain identity, can be linked together. The value can either
be obfuscatable, if the distributed ledger has mechanisms
in place to hide such links or linkable, if these links can be
inferred with some computational effort. The level of
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address traceability varies between the different DLT sys-
tems. Zcash [37] and Monero [74] are so-called privacy
coins, which perform advanced measures to unlink trans-
actions [9]. Hence, the on-chain identities of the actors
remain obfuscated. Bitcoin has linkable address traceabil-
ity [9]. In theory, transactions cannot be linked to a par-
ticular chain identity, but it has been shown that this can
actually be achieved with some computational effort [87].
The same applies to Ripple [50].
Turing completeness refers to whether a Turing machine
can be simulated by the DL and can either be Yes or No.7
Some DLs, such as Ethereum, can execute Turing
machines. This allows Turing complete smart contracts to
be stored and executed [86], in contrast to the Bitcoin
blockchain [9].
Storage denotes whether additional data can be stored
on the distributed ledger beyond the default transaction
information. The attribute value can either be yes if data
can be stored or no, if additional data cannot be stored. The
distributed ledger of Bitcoin allows arbitrary data to be
stored inside transactions. This allows Bitcoin to be used as
a base layer for other DLT systems, such as observed in the
Counterparty system [88]. In contrast to Bitcoin, IOTA
does not allow additional data to be stored [77].
4.2 Consensus
Definition 2 Consensus is the mechanism through which
entries are written to the distributed ledger, while adhering
to a set of rules that all participants enforce when an entry
containing transactions is validated.
The attributes of consensus are finality, proof, write
permission, validation permission and fee. Due to the scope
of the taxonomy to enable a comprehensive classification
of all components of a DLT system (Fig. 1), more granular
consensus attributes such as verification speed are not
considered. Nevertheless, detailed consensus attributes can
be found in [12, 49].
Finality refers to the guarantee that past transactions can
not be changed or reversed. Its value is deterministic if
consensus is guaranteed to be reached in finite time, or
probabilistic if there is some uncertainty over whether
consensus can be reached. In other terms, with regard to the
CAP theorem, a deterministic consensus is consistent and a
probabilistic algorithm can reach eventual consistency
[17]. Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithms tolerate
a class of system failures that belong to the Byzantine
Generals Problem. In particular, a consensus algorithm
with this property prevents, under some guarantees,8 con-
sensus participants from writing a false entry to the dis-
tributed ledger. The classic system layout in BFT are
permissioned systems, which finalize agreement on entries
deterministically and are safe in asynchronous environ-
ments [13]. In contrast, Nakomoto consensus signaled a
transition from these permissioned systems to permission-
less systems that only give probabilistic guarantees about
entries in a distributed ledger [57]. This type of algorithm
validates each new entry using the entire history of previ-
ous entries: An entry is accepted if there is a certain
number of new entries referencing it [9]. For instance, in
the case of Bitcoin, a writer validates a transaction by
considering the whole blockchain and then including the
transaction in a new block. When this block is referenced
by six other blocks, it is confirmed, as the probability that a
second chain of six blocks referencing each other, but not
referencing this block, is low [87], thus leading to eventual
consistency [17]. Similarly, the directed acyclic graph of
IOTA confirms an entry when it is referenced by a sig-
nificant number of new entries [88]. On the other hand,
Ripple does not use a Nakamoto consensus algorithm and it
is guaranteed that consensus can be reached in a finite
period of time [67].
Proof is the evidence used to achieve consensus. The
value can either be proof-of-work (PoW), if consensus is
achieved using the processing power of computers; proof-
of-stake (PoS), if it is achieved through voting processes
linked to (economic) power in the system; hybrid, if it is a
combination [11] of the previous two or other, if another
form of proof is required. Participants in the consensus
mechanism require proof before accepting the validity of
an entry. Bitcoin uses a proof-of-work [86], which is the
solution to a mathematical puzzle that requires computa-
tional processing power and which thus mitigates the risk
of Sybil attacks by linking the power of creating new
entries with computational work to be performed [73]. A
proof-of-stake is used by Ardor [76], which is the approval
of a randomly selected consensus participant who must
hold a stake in Ardor token units. This proof mitigates the
risk of Sybil attacks by linking entry creation power to the
economic value of hold tokens [10].
Write permission denotes who is allowed to write entries
to the distributed ledger. The value can either be restricted,
if participation is restricted or public, if it is not. Besides
the CAP Theorem, a tradeoff between decentralization,
consistency and scalability (DCS) can be observed in DLT
7 There are DLs that enable the execution of programmable scripts
that are purposefully non-Turing-complete [87], e.g. in order to
facilitate secure logic on financial transactions. These will currently
be classified as ‘‘No’’. Hence, in future work the Turing completeness
attribute could be extended to the concept of Computational
Capability which would take values in ‘‘None’’, ‘‘Limited’’ and
‘‘Touring-complete’’.
8 E.g. that malicious participants control less than one-third of the
nodes of the consensus network [13].
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systems [89]. Likewise to the CAP theorem, only two of
the properties can hold simultaneously. In context of write
permission, a restricted access impacts decentralization
negatively and performance positively [89]. In particular, a
restricted write permission can facilitate the deployment of
efficient consensus protocols such as Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [73] which can mitigate Sybil
attacks more efficiently when compared to proof-of-work
algorithms by whitelisting and bounding consensus par-
ticipants to behave correctly via contractual obliagations
[73]. The Bitcoin consensus mechanism is public [86],
meaning that it allows everyone who has computing power
to participate [67] resulting in a system characterized by
high decentralisation [89] that mitigates Sybil attacks via
its proof-of-work (Section 4.2). Conversely, the consensus
mechanism of Ripple is restricted [86], meaning that only a
few trusted institutions can participate [88] resulting in a
centralized system with a higher performance in terms of
transaction throughput.
Validate permission signifies who is allowed to validate
claims before they are written to the distributed ledger. The
value can either be restricted, if participation is restricted
or public, if it is not. As for the write permission, a
restricted validate permission impacts decentralization
negatively and performance positively. In the case of Bit-
coin, writers validate the correctness of claims before
writing them to a block: hence, the validation permission is
public. In contrast, in the case of IOTA, a central entity, the
coordinator, validates transactions before they are collected
in an entry and written to the directed acyclic graph [88]
resulting in a higher scalability of the system.
Fee denotes whether participants in the consensus
(writers and validators) are paid a fee for validating new
entries and writing them to the distributed ledger. The
value can either be yes or no. In contrast to Bitcoin, where
writers/validators are rewarded with fees [67], IOTA
writers and validators receive no fees [88]. In the case of
Ripple, consensus participants are not rewarded with fees,
although actors need to pay a fee [64]. This system layout
is captured by the fee attribute in the Action component
(Sect. 4.3).
4.3 Action
Definition 3 An action is one or more real-life activities
that can be digitally represented in a DLT system as a
transaction.
In this sense, a transaction represents a real-life action
digitally. Attributes that illustrate the access rights to and
the cost associated with these digital representations are
actor permission, read permission and fee.
Actor permission denotes who can perform an action.
The value can either be restricted if actors have to fulfill
special requirements before performing actions or public, if
anyone can perform actions. Bitcoin allows everyone to
create a private key to send and receive token units [76]:
hence, it has a public actor permission. Ripple uses
restricted access rights. In order to comply with regulations
(e.g. know-your-customer), actors need to register [76].
Read permission refers to actors that can read the con-
tents of transactions from the distributed ledger. The value
can either be restricted, if preconditions need to be fulfilled
before permission is granted, or public, if permission is not
restricted. Most DLT systems have public read access in
the sense that everyone can read the content of the actions,
which have occurred, e.g. the number of bitcoins trans-
ferred [76]. Systems utilizing privacy coins often restrict
read access to the actors involved in a transaction (e.g.
Zcash [87]), usually by making an effort to hide the
number of token units transferred [9].
Fee denotes whether an actor has to pay a fee for per-
forming an action that is unrelated to the consensus. The
values are yes or no. Some DLT systems require actors to
pay a fee that is unrelated to the consensus before they can
store an action on the distributed ledger. For instance,
actors have to pay a fee in Augur, which is not distributed
to consensus participants [59] but given to actors providing
services in the system. In the case of Bitcoin, no additional
fee is required to perform an action, except the fee paid to
the consensus participants. Ripple also requires actors to
pay a fee for each action, which is not paid to consensus
participants but is subsequently destroyed [64].
4.4 Token
Definition 4 Token is a unit of value issued within a DLT
system and which can be used as a medium of exchange or
unit of account.
The associated attributes are supply, burn, creation
condition, unconditional creation and source of value.
Supply refers to the total quantity of token units made
available. The value can either be capped, if the total
supply is limited to a finite number or uncapped otherwise.
If demand increases for a token, a capped supply can cause
the perceived token value to appreciate and corresponds to
a deflation in prices nominated in this token. Moreover, it
can result in an appreciated exchange rate with other
tokens, which in turn, increases the stability of a DLT
system [9]. Bitcoin has a capped supply of 21 million units
[76], whereas Dogecoin does not have an upper limit [9].
Burn denotes whether token supply is reduced by
removing token units. The values are yes or no. Some DLT
systems destroy token units in a process referred to as
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‘burn’. If demand remains constant, this decrease in the
money supply causes token units to appreciate and hence,
results in a better exchange rate with other tokens. For
example in the case of Ripple, paid fees are removed from
the total supply and are not returned [64]. In contrast,
Bitcoin has no inherent mechanism to destroy token units.
Transferability refers to whether the ownership of a
token unit can be changed. The value can either be trans-
ferable, if the token can be transferred, or non-transferable
otherwise. Bitcoin token units can be transferred between
different actors. Akasha plans to use non-transferable rep-
utation tokens, so-called Mana and Essence [8].
Creation condition denotes whether the creation of new
token units is linked to the incentivization of the consensus
mechanism and/or an action. The value can either be
consensus, if creation is linked to the consensus mecha-
nism, action, if creation is linked to an action, both, if
creation is linked to the consensus mechanism as well as an
action, or none otherwise. In the case of Bitcoin, new
tokens are created to incentivize the consensus mechanism
[87]. Other systems create new tokens to incentivize an
action. For instance, Steemit creates new steem to incen-
tivize content creation on the platform (e.g. writing blog
articles) [72]. Moreover, Ripple does not use its token to
incentivize the consensus mechanism or an action [64].
Furthermore, hybrid versions are possible, where new
tokens are created to incentivize both the consensus
mechanism and an action. For instance, newly created
token units in the DASH system are awarded to both the
consensus participants and the master nodes, who perform
actions such as mixing transactions to enable obfuscat-
able address traceability [15].
Unconditional creation refers to the number of new
token units that can be created that do not serve to incen-
tivize the consensus mechanism or an action. The value can
either be partial, if some tokens are created uncondition-
ally, all, if all tokens are created unconditionally (e.g. 100
% pre-mined tokens), or none otherwise. At the genesis of
the Bitcoin system, no token units had previously been
mined and all tokens come into existence by incentivizing
the consensus [9]. On the other hand, all Ripple tokens
were created during the genesis of the system. In the case
of Augur, some tokens were created during the genesis of
the system [59].
Source of value denotes the source of a token value and
what it consists of. The value can either be token, if the
token grants access to another token; distributed ledger if
the token grants access to the distributed ledger, e.g. if the
token is needed in order to use the storage or computing
capacity of the distributed ledger; consensus, if the token
grants access to the consensus mechanism, e.g. in a proof-
of-stake type system; action, if the token grants access to
perform or receive actions, goods or services in the real
world; or none, if the token has no source of value. The first
two values (distributed ledger and token) are considered to
be on-chain and the latter two are considered to be off-
chain source of values of a token unit (as depicted in
Fig. 1). The Ethereum token allows everyone to store data
or smart contracts on-chain [87] and to access in this way
the distributed ledger of the network. Hence, the source of
value of Ether token units is that they grant access to the
processing power of the distributed ledger. In contrast to
Ether, the Golem network token units allow holders to
access off-chain computations [33]. Thus, its source of
value is action as the token provides access to a service in
the real world (Action component). Siacoin enables the
storage of arbitrary data on both its distributed ledger [70]
and its off-chain network [83]. Hence its source of values
reside in the DL and Action components.
4.5 Classification of recent DLT based
distributed computing Systems
Table 2 depicts six recent works in the 19 attributes: These
contributions focus on blockchain-based systems and are not
utilizing other structures such as directed acyclic graphs
(DAG) . Moreover, none of the systems utilizes a cryptoe-
conomic token. Li et al. [47] state that creating the economic
model for such a mechanism is a complex design problem.
Two systems develop a native distributed ledger, four sys-
tems use the computing power of the Ethereum blockchain
and one system takes a hybrid approach by combining a
native blockchain implementation with Ethereum in their
system. No other DLT system such as Bitcoin or NEO is
utilized as a first layer system, despite them being used in
viable and actively maintained DLT systems (Table 4 in
Supplementary Material). Finally, the documentation of the
created DLT systems is in some of the recent contributions
not sufficient to identify all attributes which limits the
understanding of the systems design and positioning in the
existing DLT system landscape. In particular, this lack of
positioning could lead to a fragmentation in the DLT com-
munity and a duplication of effort [76].
5 Experimental methodology
This paper relies on a novel methodology (Fig. 3) that
combines a broad spectrum of inter-disciplinary methods to
contribute a useful and practical design guideline for the
DLT community: Based on the introduced conceptual
architecture (Fig. 1) a taxonomy is derived by the method
of Nickerson et al. [52]. Utilizing the taxonomy (Fig. 2), 50
DLT systems are classified. The taxonomy and classifica-
tion are evaluated by (i) the blockchain community via a
survey and (ii) a quantitative analysis of real-world data.
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Furthermore, the quantitative analysis of the classification
by the means of machine learning methods identifies key
design choices in the observed DLT systems that structure
modeling complexity at design phase. The design choices
facilitate the construction of the design guideline. In the
following, the methodologies of the classification (Sect.
5.1), the blockchain community feedback (Sect. 5.2) and
the machine learning analysis (Sect. 5.3) are illustrated.
5.1 Classification
The scope of the classification is to comprehensively cap-
ture the CED and DLT (Fig. 2) of viable, academically
referenced and actively maintained DLT systems. More-
over, the classification aims at capturing the current state of
DLT systems. In particular, features that are about to be
released in the future are not considered. Finally, in the
case that a system is 1st layer (utilizing a native distributed
ledger, e.g. a mainchain) and 2nd layer (utilizing an
external distributed ledger, e.g. sidechains), only the 1st
layer is classified. Likewise, if a system utilizes more than
one token, only the main token is classified.
In order to guarantee reproducibility, objectivity, and
comprehensiveness, a system selection process for the
classification is designed. Figure 4 depicts this process and
visualizes the number of remaining systems per refinement
step. Two websites are used:
– Coinmarketcap.com: Lists DLT systems ranked by their
market capitalization. The rationale is that the eco-
nomic value of a system is a good proxy for its
viability.
– coincodecap.com: This site lists Github indicators of
DLT systems. In particular, it contains information
about the number of code commitments, Github stars,
and contributors to a DLT system. These indicators
capture an active development of a system.
The limitation of these data sources is that they only list
systems that maintain a native cryptoeconomic token.
Hence, Blockchain-as-a-Service systems,9 such as Hyper-
ledger Fabric [4] are not considered. Moreover, depending
on the development strategy of a system, commits might be
Table 2 Classification of recent blockchain-based distributed computing systems in the 19 attributes of the introduced taxonomy









Data structure – Blockchain Blockchain – Blockchain –
Address Trace. – Not specified Traceable – Traceable –
Turing Compl. – Not specified No – No –
Storage – Yes – Not specified –
Finality – Probabilisitc Probabilistic – Deterministic –
Proof – Not specified Not
specified
– PoS –
Write Perm. – Restricted Restricted – Restricted –
Validate Perm. – Restricted Restricted – Restricted –





Public Not specified Restricted Public Restricted Restricted
Read
Permission
Public Not specified Restricted Restricted Not specified Public
Action Fee No Yes Not
specified
No No No
Supply – – – – – –
Burn – – – – – –
Transferability – – – – – –
Creation Cond. – – – – – –
Uncond.
Creation
– – – – – –
Source of Value – – – – – –
9 These are systems not utilizing a native distributed ledger, as
defined in Table 3 of the Supplementary Material.
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merged externally and only pushed occasionally as major
updates to Github. This may result in a lower rank of a
DLT system, despite being actively maintained. This lim-
itation is considered in the proposed ranking function
(Equation 1).
Snapshots of the sources were taken on the 17th April
2019 and are merged based on the systems acronym.10 In
order to account for academic relevance, the selection of
the systems is enhanced with the number of mentions of
DLT systems in Elseviers ScienceDirect database11 and
then filtered based on the criterion of whether systems are
actually mentioned in literature (#mentions[ 0). For the
database search, the following search string is utilized on
the API field qs:12 ‘‘PROJECT NAME’’ AND (Blockchain
OR Ledger).
The remaining systems are ranked based on the fol-
lowing ranking function
rðiÞ ¼ 0:6mcapðiÞ þ 0:3 ccommitðiÞ þ 0:1 ccontrðiÞ
ð1Þ
where mcap is the rank based on the market capitalization
of a system i, ccommit the commitment rank and ccontr the
contributers rank. The weights are chosen to account for
the limitation of the Github activity to be a proxy for active
system maintenance, hence the lower weights. The top 50
systems are then classified, based on an extensive literature
review performed by the first author and checked
independently by the co-authors and the blockchain com-
munity. Sources for the classification are academic litera-
ture, DLT systems websites, and whitepapers. An overview
of the final classified systems can be found in Table 2 of the
Supplementary Material. Moreover, the actual classifica-
tion of the systems is provided in Tables 4-7 of the Sup-
plementary Material.
5.2 Blockchain community feedback
Participants were invited based on their contributions to
Github13 repositories of DLT systems and their official
websites. Participants received a personalized email invi-
tation (Figure 1 in Supplementary Material) to participate
in a scientific survey to rate the classification of their DLT
system and the expressiveness (as defined in Sect. 6.1.3) of
the proposed taxonomy. A total of 326 invitations were
sent and 85 practitioners in the field responded (response
rate 26:1%). 50 respondents completed the survey (com-
pletion rate 58:8%). Only completed surveys are consid-
ered in the analysis. The participants were recruited during
two phases each lasting two months: The first beginning on
the 22nd of March 2018 and the second on 24th July 2019.
The feedback of the first phase resulted in improvements of
the taxonomy, as illustrated in Sect. 2 of the Supplementary
Material, and the feedback of both phases resulted in
improvements of the classification.
5.2.1 Classification
In the first part of the survey, the participants were shown
the classification of the four components and 19 attributes
of the DLT system to which they contribute. Consult Fig. 2
for an overview of the attributes and Tables 4-7 of the
Supplementary Material for the classification ratings. The
participants had the option to agree, disagree, or state that
they were uncertain about the classification. They could
always comment on their decision, irrespective of their
choice.
In order to calculate the consistency with which par-
ticipants rated the classification of the same system, the
consistency per attribute is calculated as follows: Assum-
ing equidistance in the Likert scale [53], the participant
responses are represented by a linear scale whereby 0
denotes disagreement, 0.5 denotes uncertainty, and 1
denotes agreement. Then, for each DLT system from which
more than one response was obtained, as illustrated in
Table 3, the consistency of responses is calculated for each
system and attribute with the mean absolute error between
the responses. Then, the average consistency for each
attribute over all DLT systems is obtained by calculating
Fig. 4 Identification and selection process of top 50 systems for
classification ranked according to Sect. 5.1. The final classification is
provided in the supplementary materials
10 A three-letter code identifying the token of a system.
11 Database of peer-reviewed literature, enabling full-text searches:
https://www.elsevier.com/solutions/sciencedirect (last accessed: Jan-
uary 2021).
12 Searches over all article excluding references: https://dev.elsevier.
com/tecdoc_sdsearch_migration.html (last accessed: May 2019). 13 Available at https://github.com (last accessed: January 2021).
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the weighted average value of the previously calculated
mean absolute errors.
5.2.2 Taxonomy
In the second part of the survey, the blockchain community
is asked to evaluate the taxonomy (Fig. 2). Nickerson et al.
propose five criteria to assess the usefulness of a taxonomy
[52]. Namely, a taxonomy is
– concise, if it uses a limited number of attributes,
– robust, if it uses enough attributes to clearly differen-
tiate the objects of interest
– comprehensive, if it can classify all known objects
within the domain under considerations,
– extensible, if it allows for inclusion of additional
attributes and attribute values when new types of
objects appear,
– explanatory, if it contains attributes that do not model
every possible detail of the objects but, rather, provide
useful explanations of the nature of the objects or help
to understand future objects.
The literature review (Sect. 2) reveals differences regard-
ing how many attributes should be included in a robust
taxonomy of DLT systems. Also, the scope of the classi-
fication is to comprehensively classify the CED of all
academically relevant systems. Thus, considering these
two points, the taxonomy is evaluated using the robustness
and comprehensiveness criteria of Nickerson et al. [52]. To
this end, this paper introduces the concept of
expressiveness:
Definition 5 A taxonomy is expressive when it is robust
and comprehensive.
where a robust and comprehensive taxonomy are given
by Nickerson et al. [52]. The perceived expressiveness of
the developed taxonomy can be determined by asking the
survey participants:
Question 1 How expressive is [component/attribute] to
differentiate between and classify DLT systems.
This formulation neither exposes survey participants to
the theory of expressiveness, comprehensiveness, and
robustness nor overloads them with a high number of
questions.
The consistency calculation for the taxonomy feedback
follows along the lines of the classification (Sect. 5.2.1):
Despite utilizing a five-point Likert scale (from very non-
expressive to very expressive) to create values ranging
from zero to one, the calculation of consistency remains the
same as the one for the classification.
5.3 Machine learning analysis
In order to extract the key design choices from the classi-
fied DLT systems, two state of the art unsupervised
machine learning methods are applied to the classified
systems. Because the data is not labeled, supervised
methods such as logistic regression are not utilized that
would require access to such appropriate training data:
1. Mulitple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is a statis-
tical method that is widely used in the social sciences
and which is applied in recent machine learning
contributions [61, 78]. It can analyze data without a
priori assumptions concerning the data, such as data
falling into discrete clusters or variables being inde-
pendent [1, 25]. It is a generalization of the principal
component analysis (PCA) for categorical data coded
in the form of an indicator matrix or a Burt matrix [26],
which aims at summarizing underlying structures in the
fewest possible dimensions [85]. In particular, MCA
identifies new latent, pair-wise orthogonal dimensions,
which are a combination of the original dimensions.
[27]. Similar to PCA, these dimensions are ordered by
their power to explain the amount of variance in the
data [1].
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2. Kmeans [31] for varying k is applied on the classifi-
cation to cluster the DLT systems based on their
attribute values. Clustering is a universal machine
learning technique, broadly utilized in data mining
[32]. The optimum number of clusters is derived by
both, performing a bootstrap evaluation that determines
the stability of the clusters [29] and by two well-known
cluster evaluation metrics: Silhouette and Calinski-
Harabasz [63].
MCA is utilized in the machine learning analysis of Sect.
6.2 to identify underlying design choices in the classified
systems because it can reduce the complexity of the tax-
onomy to fewer dimensions by clustering the original
attributes. This is an advantage of this method when
compared to other standard unsupervised methods such as
hierarchical clustering. K-means is then applied to validate
the identified design choices. The significance of this
approach lies in the fact that the design choices are derived
quantitatively by reasoning based on validated empirical
data: the viable and actively maintained DTL systems
classified according to the taxonomy (Sect. 5.2.1).
6 Experimental evaluation
The evaluation aims to identify key design choices that
govern the modeling complexity of DLT systems at design
phase. In order to base these insights on a strong footing,
first, the taxonomy and classification are validated by
feedback from the blockchain community (Sect. 6.1). Then
two machine learning methods are applied on the classifi-
cation to mine the design choices on a quantitative basis.
(Sect. 6.2).
6.1 Blockchain community feedback
The taxonomy (Sect. 4, Fig. 2) and classification
(Table 4-7 of the Supplementary Material) are evaluated
using feedback from the blockchain community.
6.1.1 Demographics
Table 3 shows the demographics of the survey participants.
In particular, it shows participants specific roles for the
systems and their experience. The 50 participants work in
(core) technical (25 developers) and strategic (7 Project
leads) positions. Moreover, 15 participants have more than
3 years of experience, 29 participants have worked 1 to 3
years, and 6 participants have worked for less than a year in
the field of DLT systems. Moreover, Table 3 illustrates that
the participants are involved in 33 out of the 50 classified
systems.
6.1.2 Classification
Figure 5a depicts the aggregate acceptance level for each
of the components. The Distributed Ledger component
received the highest acceptance level with 88:0%, followed
by the Token component (86:8%), Action component
(82:0%) and Consensus component (77:8%).
Figure 6 illustrates the acceptance level for each attri-
bute of the four components. It is noteworthy that the
average approval rating over all components is 83:7%. Five
attributes are above 90%: transferability (96:2%), origin
(92:0%), DL data structure (97:8%), creation condition
(90:0%) and unconditional creation (90:0%). The fig-
ure shows that the highest disagreements relate to the
validate permission (17:4%), source of value (15:4%Þ and
storage (15:4%Þ. The highest degree of uncertainty is
expressed regarding the action fee (18:0%), consensus
finality (17:4%) and consensus proof (13:0%) attributes.
In order to investigate the consistency of the responses,
the weighted consistency averages for each attribute are
depicted in Fig. 8. The overall consistency is on average
89:9%. The lowest consistency measured relates to the
consensus type (79:2%) and action fee (82:4%), correlating
with the higher degree of disagreement observed earlier.
The highest consistencies are observed for the DL data
structure (100:0%), origin (97:3%), actor permission
(96:4%), supply (95:8%), creation condition (95:6%) and
unconditional creation (95:6%) attributes.
In a nutshell, the acceptance level of 83:7% over all
components and the average consistency of 89:9% indi-
cates the acceptance of the classification by the
community.
6.1.3 Taxonomy
Figure 5b depicts the expressiveness of the four compo-
nents as perceived by the survey participants. The Con-
sensus component is seen as the most expressive (92:0%),
followed by Distributed Ledger (90:0%), Token (70:0%)
Fig. 5 Acceptance level of the classification and expressiveness of
taxonomy components as perceived by survey participants
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and Action component (64:0%). The highest uncertainty
relates to the Action (24:0%) and Token (22:0%) compo-
nents. The Action component consists of the lowest num-
ber of attributes, which may decrease its perceived
expressiveness. In particular, the reduced number of attri-
butes seems to hinder differentiation between DLT sys-
tems. Moreover, the literature review reveals, that
Consensus is included in all taxonomies (Sect. 2). Thus this
component might have been the most familiar to the par-
ticipants resulting in higher expressiveness.
15 participants commented on the expressiveness of the
components. They stated that a component depicting the
governance of a system should be illustrated by the tax-
onomy (26:6%),14 including the funding of a DLT system.
Three participants (20%) mention that the Action compo-
nent is not expressive enough to illustrate specific features
of a system, such as the distribution of actors. Similar
statements were made about the Token component
(20:0%). In particular, it has been stated, that inter-token
dynamics should be covered and that further attributes are
required to illustrate the creation conditions and 1st and 2nd
layer tokens (20:0%). Moreover, the quality of code
implementation, type of programming language, strategy
of code development and scalability of the system has been
mentioned (26:6%) as expressive attributes missing in the
taxonomy. One participant stated, that the source of value
attribute should be more sharply defined,15 and another
used the opportunity to further elaborate on the system
functioning. Finally, some participants made statements
endorsing the construction of the taxonomy (13:3%).
Figure 7 depicts the perceived expressiveness of the 19
attributes. The five most expressive attributes are deemed
to be transferability (88:5%), read permission (86:0%),
origin (84:0%), actor permission (82:0%), write permis-
sion (82:0%) and DL data structure (82:0%). Action
fee (26:0%), storage (23:1%), consensus type (22:0%) and
burn (22%) raise the highest degree of uncertainty. The
least expressive attributes are deemed to be the consensus
proof (14:0%), burn (14:0%) and Turing completeness/
unconditional creation (each 12:0%) attributes. Despite the
Action component being the least expressive component,
two of its attributes are amongst the top five most
Fig. 6 Classification evaluation of the attributes, grouped component-wise
Fig. 7 Expressiveness evaluation of the attributes, grouped component-wise (N = 50)
14 In brackets are depicted the percentage for which this responds
type accounts for the overall received comments. Please note, that the
percentages do not add up to 100% as a survey participant’s
comments can account for more than one responds type.
15 Since the participant’s feedback the definition of the source of




expressive attributes. This supports the consideration to
extend the action component by adding further attributes. A
similar observation is made for the Token component:
transferability is the most expressive attribute, but the
perceived expressiveness of its component is lower than for
the DL and Consensus components, which suggests
extending the attributes of the Token component.
The assessment of the feedback regarding the attributes
provided by the survey participants during the first
recruitment phase lead to an inclusion of further attributes
into the taxonomy. The nature and reasoning of these
adjustments can be found in Sect. 2 of the Supplementary
Material. This inclusion of new attributes indicates that the
taxonomy is extensible [52].
Figure 8b depicts the consistency with which the par-
ticipants evaluated the expressiveness of the taxonomy
attributes. The average consistency over all attributes is
85:5%; meaning that survey respondents from the same
DLT systems rated the expressiveness of the taxonomy
similarly to each other. In particular, they diverge from
each other just 14:5% on average, that is less than one
choice difference on the aforementioned Likert scale.
In a nutshell, the average expressiveness rating of 79%
over all components and the average consistency of 85:5%
indicates that the taxonomy is expressive.
6.2 Machine learning analysis
The multiple correspondence analysis is utilized to identify
underlying design choices in the classified systems. In
particular, the method identifies new latent dimensions,
which are a combination of the original attributes of the
taxonomy. In Table 4 these twelve latent dimensions and
their contribution to the explained variance in the data after
applying Benzceri (optimistic) and Greenacre (pessimistic)
corrections are depicted in decreasing order of importance.
The first four dimensions account for 96:2% of total
variation (for the Benzecri correction) and thus are con-
sidered significant to explain the variance in the data.
Figure 9 depicts how these four dimensions are deter-
mined by both, the original attribute values of the taxon-
omy and the classified 50 systems. The contributions are
calculated by dividing the factor scores of attributes/clas-
sified systems for a dimension by the eigenvalue of that
dimension [1]. The four significant dimensions in the new
vector space are in descending order of explained variance:
– Dimension 1: Illustrates if a system is layered. In
particular, if the system uses a native distributed ledger
or an external one and thus corresponds to the origin
attribute of the taxonomy.
– Dimension 2: Illustrates the participation level in a
system. In particular, the degree of openness is
represented ranging from permissioned (e.g. restricted
Actor permission) to permissionless systems.
– Dimension 3: Illustrates the capability to stake, e.g., if
the system utilizes a PoS typical layout such as a token
providing access to participate in the consensus.
– Dimension 4: Illustrates the level of cryptoeconomic
complexity. The values range from complex (e.g. token
interactions) to simple (e.g. tokens not burnable).
The second, third and fourth dimensions are not trivially
determined by studying the classified systems visually, as
the determining attribute values span over several compo-
nents. Moreover, the differentiation between permissioned
and permissionless systems [81, 84] and the degree of
staking capability [7, 40] reflect ongoing discussion of the
community on the effective design of DLT systems. The
actor permission attribute contributes significantly to the
Table 4 Eigenvalues and corresponding explained variances of MCA
dimensions after applying Benzecri and Greenacre correction
Dim Description Eigenvalue Corrected variances
Benzceri Greenacre
1 Layering 0.311 0.764 0.679
2 Participation 0.060 0.148 0.132
3 Staking capability 0.013 0.032 0.029
4 Cryptoec. complexity 0.007 0.018 0.016
5 0.006 0.014 0.012
6 0.003 0.008 0.007
7 0.002 0.006 0.005
8 0.002 0.004 0.004
9 0.001 0.003 0.002
10 0.001 0.002 0.001
11 0.001 0.001 0.001
12 0 0.001 0.000
13 0 0 0
Fig. 8 Weighted average of consistency calculation per attribute,




construction of the permissionless dimensions, as depicted
in Fig. 9b, and hence this dimension extends the permis-
sionless concept from the consensus to the Action com-
ponent. Neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum contributes
significantly to the construction of the new dimensions,
despite being studied the most in academic literature (588,
respectively 296 citations in Elsevier’s ScienceDirect
database). This might be due to other systems adopting the
design of these well-known DLT systems and hence their
design does not contribute significantly to the variance in
the data. Additionally, observing the systems that con-
tribute the most to the 4th dimension (level of cryptoeco-
nomic complexity), one notices that these are systems that
address a specific domain, respectively address a particular
challenge and hence require an elaborated CED (e.g., PVIX
and Zcoin are privacy chains, and Komodo and Bancor are
decentralized exchanges).
Figure 10 depicts the 50 DLT systems in the new
dimensions. A strong clustering of systems can be observed
for the first two dimensions (Fig. 10a, and a weaker for
the 2nd and 3rd dimensions (Fig. 10b, which is explained
due to to the lower explained variance in the data by the
latter dimension.
Table 5 outlines the cluster stability and the number of
dissolved clusters when applying k-means for various k on
the classified attribute values of the 50 DLT systems.
Comparing the bootmean16 (cluster-wise average Jaccard
similarity) and bootbrd (cluster-wise number of times a
cluster is dissolved) identifies three clusters as the most
stable separation of the classification. This is further vali-
dated by the Silhouette and Calinski-Harabasz score, which
identify two or three clusters to be optimal, as depicted in
Fig. 4 of the Supplementary Material.
Fig. 9 Absolute contribution [1] (flow’s thickness) of attribute values (left) and systems (right) to value of new dimension (middle/italics
underneath the figures). The color code depicts if attribute value/system contributes negatively (red/dark) or positively (green/light)
Fig. 10 DLT systems in the latent dimensions, as identified by MCA.
The labels are determined by the k-means clustering algorithm. The
translation of the identifiers to DLT systems can be found in Table 1
of the Supplementary Material. Moreover, Fig. 3 in the Supplemen-
tary Material illustrates other combinations of dimensions
Table 5 Bootstrap statistics of identified clusters when applying
kmeans with varying k on classification: k ¼ 3 results in the most
stable clusters
k Boot Cluster
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 Mean 0.91 0.95 – – – –
brd 12 1 – – – –
3 Mean 0.96 0.97 1 – – –
brd 0 0 0 – – –
4 Mean 0.75 0.91 0.99 75 – –
brd 19 1 1 21 – –
5 Mean 0.71 0.64 0.43 0.62 1 –
brd 25 32 80 25 0 –
6 Mean 0.82 1 0.70 0.65 0.5 0.64
brd 19 0 23 33 68 44
16 ‘‘Highly stable’’ clusters should yield values of 0.85 and above:




In Fig. 10, the DLT systems are labeled based on these
clusters. One notices, considering the distribution of labels
in Fig. 10a, that the three clusters can be identified as 2nd
layer systems, permissioned systems, and permissionless
systems. Likewise, utilizing the same labeling in Fig. 10b,
it is noticed that these three clusters form distinct groups:
2nd layer systems being in the center, followed by per-
missionless and permissioned systems.
Figure 11 depicts the number of new systems per year
and cluster. The number of newly introduced systems
peaked in 2014, when in total 15 of the 50 systems were
introduced. This high number is mainly due to the intro-
duction of permissionless systems. In recent years, the
probability of introducing a permissioned or permissionless
system is equal, while introducing a 2nd layer system has
been lower.
The analysis concludes, that two key design choices in
DLT systems are identified method-independently: layer-
ing and participation level. Moreover, staking capability
and cryptoeconomic complexity are identified by MCA.
The key design choices are not apparent in the taxonomy
but are still captured by a combination of attribute values,
which is an indication of the rich information the taxonomy
can encode and explain. Hence, those findings support the
explanatory capacity of the taxonomy as defined in earlier
taxonomy theory [52]. Moreover, the combination of
attribute values into key design choices identified by the
analysis limits the system configuration options and as a
result reduces modeling complexity of DLT systems at
design phase.
6.3 Summary of findings
The key findings of the performed experiments are sum-
marized as follows:
– The proposed taxonomy (Fig. 2) is useful, as defined in
earlier taxonomy literature [52]. In particular, the
blockchain community validates the taxonomy as
robust and comprehensive (on average 79% expres-
siveness, Sect. 6.1). Moreover, the taxonomy is exten-
sible (Sect. 6.1) and explanatory (Sect. 6.2), as found
by analyzing the blockchain community feedback and
applying machine learning methods on the classifica-
tion. These findings also showcase the educational
value of the proposed taxonomy.
– When compared with other viable and actively main-
tained DLT systems (Table 4 Supplementary Material),
recent distributed computing contributions focus on a
small subset of potential DLT system design configu-
rations (e.g. Blockchain-based systems with no cryp-
toeconomic Token) (Sect. 4.5). The documentation of
design choices in some of the contributions is found to
be limited which hinders the understanding of the
proposed systems functioning and which could result in
a duplication of effort.
– The classification of 50 viable and actively maintained
DLT systems is accepted by the blockchain community
(on average 83:7% acceptance over all components,
Sect. 6.1.2).
– The quantitative analysis of the classification identifies
four key design choices that structure the modeling
complexity of DLT systems at design phase (Sect. 6.2).
Each of these choices combines several attribute values
and thus reduces the configuration complexity of DLT
systems.
In a nutshell, the findings demonstrate that the contribu-
tions of this paper support system designers to systemati-
cally study and design DLT systems: The conceptual
architecture and taxonomy map the space of possible sys-
tem design configurations and thus assist researchers to
position a system within the DLT landscape. For instance,
the taxonomy can support the identification of blockchain
parameters as required by the framework of Pavithran et al.
[58]. Moreover, the classification reflects well the design
configurations of existing DLT systems. Finally, the iden-
tified design choices provide new insights about influential
and determining system elements and thus accelerate the
design process. Hence, the contributions of this work can
support the distributed computing community to (i) explore
the design configuration space of DLT systems, (ii) to
create novel applications and (iii) to document their con-
tributions comprehensively.
7 Design guideline for distributed ledgers
Based on the findings of the analysis (Sect. 6.3), a design
guideline is derived (Fig. 12). The key design choices are
determined quantitatively by applying machine learning
Fig. 11 Number of Github repository creations of classified DLT
systems for the clusters identified by k-means
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algorithms on empirical data. The order is determined by
the level of explained variance, as calculated by MCA.17
Each question corresponds to a binary design decision. For
each decision, the six attribute values that contribute most
to this design choice are illustrated. Moreover, for each
choice, the systems that match best the attribute value
configuration are depicted. Hence, this guideline structures
the modeling complexity of DLT systems and can be used
to accelerate the design phase by grouping together system
design configurations. The ordering of design choices
based on the explained variance in the observed DLT
systems helps to differentiate existing DLT systems. As a
result, the guideline can be used to provide new insights,
support scientific novelty and business innovation. In par-
ticular, it can be used both for designing novel systems
more effectively by providing default system configura-
tions (Attribute values in Fig. 12) as well as to study DLT
Fig. 12 A design guideline of the key design choices in DLT systems,
suggesting an order with which a designer may determine system
configuration. The questions, attribute values, example systems, and
order are a result of analysis conducted using real-world data and
machine learning methods (Sect. 6.2). For each design decision
identified via the MCA analysis, attribute values and the correspond-
ing example systems that match best the respective design decision
are illustrated
17 This proposed order is not strict and it represents which design




systems by illustrating similar systems (Example systems
in Fig. 12).
The applicability of the guideline can be presented with
the following: Designers determine the goals of the system
and the constraints they have and then apply the guideline
to identify a default system configuration. For instance, a
designer develops a business model with a complex cryp-
toeconomic design (Decision 4 in Fig. 12). Due to time
constraints, they go for building a second layer system
(Decision 1 in Fig. 12). By looking at the suggested attri-
bute values, the designers focus on attributes of the Action
and Token component. In this case, amongst others, the
designers are guided to consider token interactions (Source
of value: Token) in their cryptoeconomic design. More-
over, by looking at the intersection of the systems falling
under these design choices (Example Systems in Fig. 12),
the Bancor and Aragon systems are identified as similar.
Hence the guideline informs researchers about DLT sys-
tems sharing underlying commonalities.
In a nutshell, the derived guideline structures the mod-
eling complexity of DLT systems at design phase and
determines systems that share similar design choices.
These design choices are systematically and rigorously
determined using machine learning techniques and empir-
ical data from existing viable and actively maintained DLT
systems. Therefore such a guide can provide a more
informed and tailored understanding of the DLT architec-
tural elements, accelerate the design phase, prevent a
duplication of effort and thus support the distributed
computing and business community to innovate more
efficiently.
8 Conclusion and future work
This paper concludes that the evolving complexity of dis-
tributed ledgers can be better understood via a proposed
taxonomy of DLT systems designed according to standards
of state-of-the-art taxonomy theory [52]. To support such
understanding, this paper contributes a systematic and
rigorous classification of 50 viable and actively maintained
DLT systems into the taxonomy using wisdom of the
crowd and machine learning methods fed with real-world
data. From that data a novel design guideline is derived that
identifies key design choices that govern the complexity of
distributed ledgers. The contributed guideline is a result of
a novel data-driven methodology that structures the mod-
eling complexity of DLT systems at design phase and thus
can support the business and distributed computing com-
munity to innovate. Its value in education lies in better
understanding and comparing the design of distributed
ledgers.
Hence, the contributions of this paper can explain and
provide new insights for researchers, practitioners and
entrepreneurs about which choices in the DLT system
design space have the highest impact, where there is room
for innovation and which systems have competitive fea-
tures or shared designs.
The results point to various avenues for future research.
Firstly, the findings of this paper suggest that the taxonomy
can be further extended with additional Action and Token
attributes. Also, a component modeling the governance of
the systems may become critical in deciding if a system has
a decentralized organization (e.g. no trusted party). Sec-
ondly, although the taxonomy represents the current state
of viable and actively maintained DLT systems, the pro-
posed methods to evaluate its usefulness are general.
Hence, future research can quantify with the introduced
methodology the extent to which suggested extensions
affect the usefulness of the proposed taxonomy. Thirdly,
the initial cluster analysis demonstrates that key design
choices can be derived quantitatively by analyzing empir-
ical data of viable and actively maintained DLT systems.
This suggests to extend the classification in future work
(e.g. with Blockchain-as-a-Service systems such as
Hyperledger Fabric [4]) and to apply different statistical
methods to the data in order to validate and further identify
key design choices. In particular, further design choices
that illustrate token layouts such as the identified Staking
Capability (Fig. 12) could facilitate the creation of novel
incentives to address societal challenges [21, 41] (e.g, data
and service management challenges in smart cities [3, 60]).
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